A less elegant Epicurean approach in progress...

If we are to say that belief is a matter of conviction or opinion [a position apart from fact, empiricism, objectivity, or intrinsically effective (as oppose to absolute) consequences] does it not then follow that belief is in a sense unconditional: an assuredness of conditions that are not classically knowable, or an assuredness that does not, by nature of what it is, intrinsically reflect the conditions it alleges of known reality?

And if this is the case, does it not then follow that the motivation to believe is essentially disconnected, in the aforementioned sense, from what is believed?

Yet, if we are to say that belief is also a matter of laying claim to {what is}, does it not then follow that a belief betrays itself, in acknowledging that that which it posits is not necessarily what is - but what is wished to be?

Why not call it a wish? Or are the two words not synonymous afterall?